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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
William Schwab appeals from an order of the District 
Court affirming an order of the Bankruptcy Court granting 
CGL, LLC’s motion for leave to sue Schwab in the Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas for actions 
taken in his capacity as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of 
VistaCare Group, LLC.  The primary question on appeal is 
whether the Barton doctrine, which requires a party seeking 
to sue a court-appointed receiver, to first obtain leave of the 
appointing court, applies to bankruptcy trustees in light of 
changes in the bankruptcy laws.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we hold that (1) the Barton doctrine continues to apply 
to bankruptcy trustees and (2) the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision to grant leave in this case was proper.  Therefore, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
 William Schwab (“the Trustee”) was appointed as the 
Chapter 7 trustee of the bankruptcy estate of VistaCare 
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Group, LLC (“VistaCare”).  VistaCare’s bankruptcy estate 
included Parkside Manor Retirement Community 
(“Parkside”), a 12.2 acre parcel of land located in Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania.  The parcel consisted of forty-five lots, 
forty-four of which were subdivided and zoned for mobile 
homes.  The forty-fifth lot (“Lot 45”) contained a four-story 
retirement and assisted living facility.  All of the lots shared 
common infrastructure, including roads, sewer lines, storm 
lines, and water lines.  The lots were subject to a subdivision 
plan, which contained various restrictions, including 
“Restriction No. 1,” which provided:  “Fee title to the Lot 
shown on this plan will not be transferred to the parties 
having residences constructed upon the said Lots, but title 
will remain in the developer, his heirs and assigns.”  The 
subdivision plan was approved by East Cocalico Township 
(“the Township”) and recorded in the Office of the Recorder 
of Deeds of Lancaster County. 
 On July 25, 2008, the Trustee filed a motion in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, seeking authorization to sell Parkside, either as 
one parcel, or as two separate parcels, with one parcel 
consisting of Lot 45 and the other containing the remaining 
forty-four lots.  The Trustee’s motion acknowledged the 
existence of Restriction No. 1 and stated that a sale of 
Parkside as two separate parcels “would be contingent upon 
approval by East Cocalico Township of the modification of 
Restriction No. 1 to allow the personal care home and the 
mobile home park to be separated.”  The Bankruptcy Court 
granted the motion on August 21, 2008.  On September 27, 
2008, after a public auction, CGL, LLC (“CGL”) entered into 
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an agreement for the purchase of Lot 45.  On November 14, 
2008, the Township Solicitor confirmed that Restriction No. 1 
did not prevent the sale of Lot 45, and in an order dated 
March 10, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court stated, “[t]his sale 
shall . . . be free and clear of Restriction #1 of the Subdivision 
Plan.”  The sale of Lot 45 closed on May 8, 2009. 
 During this time, the Trustee had determined that it 
was necessary to liquidate the remaining forty-four lots on 
Parkside.  While making preparations to sell the lots, the 
Trustee discovered that some residents in the mobile home 
park had permanently affixed their mobile homes to the land.  
The Trustee then instituted adversary actions against these 
residents.  To resolve the adversary actions, the Trustee and 
the residents agreed that the lots could be sold to the 
residents, despite Restriction No. 1’s prohibition on sales to 
individuals “having residences constructed” on the land.  
Most of the lots were subsequently sold to the individual 
residents.  For each sale, the Trustee filed a Report of Sale 
with the Bankruptcy Court.  On December 14, 2009, the 
Trustee and the Township entered into an agreement 
abrogating Restriction No. 1 as to the forty-four individual 
lots.  CGL was not a party to that agreement. 
 On July 30, 2010, CGL filed in the Bankruptcy Court a 
motion for leave to file suit against the Trustee in the 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas.  
CGL alleged that the sales of the individual lots were 
unlawful and that such sales damaged its property interests in 
Lot 45.  CGL further alleged that the December 14 agreement 
between the Trustee and the Township abrogating Restriction 
No. 1 deprived CGL of its property rights without notice and 
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without due process of law.  On August 12, 2010, the Trustee 
filed a response, in which he asserted that under Barton v. 
Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881), CGL could not proceed in 
state court without the permission of the Bankruptcy Court.  
The Trustee urged the Bankruptcy Court to refuse to give 
permission in this case, arguing that CGL’s proposed state 
law claims were “frivolous.”  The Trustee also asserted 
various “affirmative defenses.” 
 On October 21, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court held a 
hearing on CGL’s motion, in which Grant Wise, the sole 
owner of CGL, and the Trustee, testified.  During the hearing, 
the Bankruptcy Court expressed doubt as to whether CGL 
needed its permission to file suit against the Trustee in state 
court, opining that Barton was “antiquated and probably not 
controlling in the Third Circuit.”  Nevertheless, the 
Bankruptcy Court went on to determine whether it should 
grant leave in this case.  After hearing arguments, the 
Bankruptcy Court concluded that although it could not predict 
whether CGL would be successful on its state law claims, 
such claims were not “on [their] surface, frivolous.”  The 
Bankruptcy Court added that state court was the appropriate 
forum to resolve the dispute given that state courts “probably 
ha[d] an expertise in th[e] area.”  On October 22, 2010, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued an order formally granting CGL’s 
motion for leave. 
 The Trustee appealed to the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  On May 26, 2011, the 
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order.  In re 
Vistacare Grp., LLC, No. 10-2522, 2011 WL 2111997, at *5 
(M.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).  The District Court declined to 
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address the Trustee’s claim that the Bankruptcy Court 
erroneously found that Barton did not apply, reasoning that 
although the Bankruptcy Court questioned Barton’s 
continued validity, the Bankruptcy Court did, in fact, examine 
whether it should approve CGL’s motion for leave.  Id. at *3.  
The District Court then concluded that the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision to grant leave was proper.  Id. at *3-4.  The 
Trustee filed a timely notice of appeal.1
II. 
 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b).  The District Court had jurisdiction over the 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  
On appeal, “we ‘stand in the shoes’ of the District Court and 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.”  In re Global Indus. 
Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(citations omitted).  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s legal 
determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear 
error.  Id.  We review a bankruptcy court’s decision to grant a 
motion for leave to sue a trustee under the deferential abuse 
of discretion standard.  In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 546 (7th 
                                              
1 On June 24, 2011, while this appeal was pending, 
CGL filed suit against the Trustee in the Lancaster County 
Court of Common Pleas.  On July 20, 2011, the case was 
removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and is currently pending in that court.  CGL, 
LLC v. Schwab, Civ. No. 11-4593. 
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Cir. 1998); In re Beck Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
III. 
A. 
The first question presented by this case is whether a 
party must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it 
brings an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee 
for acts done in the trustee’s official capacity.  We now join 
our sister circuits in holding that, under the doctrine 
established in Barton v. Barbour, leave of the bankruptcy 
court is required before instituting such an action.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence v. Goldberg, 573 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the Barton doctrine is applicable to bankruptcy 
trustees); In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 970 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (same); Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 143 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (same); In re Linton, 136 F.3d at 545-46 (same); In 
re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(same); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (same); Anderson v. United States, 520 F.2d 1027, 
1029 (5th Cir. 1975) (same).2
 Established by the Supreme Court over a century ago, 
the Barton doctrine provides that “before suit is brought 
against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which he was 
 
                                              
2 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Eighth, 
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have not spoken on 
the issue, at least not in published precedential opinions. 
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appointed must be obtained.”  104 U.S. at 128 (citing Davis v. 
Gray, 83 U.S. 203 (1872)).  The Barton Court explained that 
a court approval requirement was necessary to ensure a 
consistent and equitable administration of the receivership 
property.  Id. at 128-29.  Because a judgment against the 
receiver in his capacity as receiver would be satisfied out of 
the receivership property, the effect of a suit brought without 
leave to recover such a judgment would be “to take the 
property of the trust from [the receiver’s] hands and apply it 
to the payment of the plaintiff’s claim, without regard to the 
rights of other creditors or the orders of the court which [was] 
administering the trust property.”  Id.  In other words, the 
party bringing suit would be able to “obtain [an] advantage 
over the other claimants” as to the distribution of “the assets 
in the receiver’s hands.”  Id. at 128.  The Court further 
observed that if the judgment “were recovered outside the 
territorial jurisdiction” of the court administering the trust 
assets (i.e., the appointing court), that court would be 
“impotent” to prevent enforcement of the judgment.  Id.  
Thus, requiring a party with claims against the receiver to 
obtain permission from the appointing court before filing suit 
in another jurisdiction would prevent the “usurpation of the 
powers and duties which belonged exclusively to [the 
appointing] court” and protect “the duty of that court to 
distribute the trust assets to creditors equitably and according 
to their respective priorities.”  Id. at 136. 
 As the Court explained ten years later in McNulta v. 
Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 330 (1891), the Barton doctrine was 
not dependent on any federal statute, but instead was based on 
principles of common law.  Accordingly, after Barton, courts 
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in “[a]n unbroken line of cases,” In re Linton, 136 F.3d at 545 
(citations omitted), imposed as a matter of federal common 
law, a requirement that a party seeking to sue an equity 
receiver must first obtain the permission of the appointing 
court.  See, e.g., Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473, 478-80 
(1893); Merryweather v. United States, 12 F.2d 407, 408 (9th 
Cir. 1926); Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969, 970-71 
(2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).  Absent such permission, no 
other court would have jurisdiction to hear the suit.  Porter, 
149 U.S. at 479 (“It is for [the appointing] court, in its 
discretion, to decide whether it will determine for itself all 
claims of or against the receiver, or will allow them to be 
litigated elsewhere.”); Barton, 104 U.S. at 136-37.  Although 
Barton involved an equity receiver, subsequent courts 
extended the Barton doctrine to bankruptcy trustees, 
reasoning that much like a receiver, a trustee was appointed 
by the court to oversee the debtor’s estate, and therefore was 
“an officer of the court” whose “possession [was] protected 
because it [was] the court’s.”  Vass, 59 F.2d at 970 (citations 
omitted).  Although we have never explicitly held that 
Barton’s leave-of-court requirement applies to bankruptcy 
trustees, in In re National Molding Co., 230 F.2d 69, 70-71 
(3d Cir. 1956), we examined whether a bankruptcy referee 
erred in denying a party’s motion for leave to sue a trustee in 
a “plenary action” in New Jersey state court.  Thus, implicit 
in our decision was that a party seeking to sue a trustee for 
acts taken in his official capacity must obtain permission from 
the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceeding.  See id. 
In this case, although the Bankruptcy Court did not 
definitively hold that the Barton doctrine did not apply to 
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bankruptcy trustees, during the hearing on CGL’s motion for 
leave, the Bankruptcy Court stated that the doctrine was 
“antiquated and probably not controlling in the Third 
Circuit.”  The Bankruptcy Court opined that although courts 
may have applied the Barton doctrine to bankruptcy trustees 
under the bankruptcy system in place before 1978, the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, commonly known as the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1527 (“the Bankruptcy 
Code” or “the Code”), fundamentally overhauled the 
bankruptcy laws, and in the process, raised doubts about the 
continued applicability of Barton.  During the hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Judge echoed the concerns he had previously 
raised in In re Lambert, 438 B.R. 523 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
2010).  In that case, the court concluded that the Bankruptcy 
Code had superseded the common law Barton doctrine.  Id. at 
526.  We disagree; as we explain below, the Barton doctrine 
has continuing validity. 
Although Congress has never expressly codified the 
Barton doctrine, implicit in a provision of the Judicial Code, 
28 U.S.C. § 959(a), is a general rule that a party seeking to 
sue a receiver or trustee must first obtain permission from the 
appointing court.  Section 959(a) provides: 
“Trustees, receivers or managers of any 
property, including debtors in possession, may 
be sued, without leave of the court appointing 
them, with respect to any of their acts or 
transactions in carrying on business connected 
with such property.  Such actions shall be 
subject to the general equity power of such 
court so far as the same may be necessary to the 
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ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a 
litigant of his right to trial by jury.” 
28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (emphasis added).3
This provision, originally enacted in 1887, just six 
years after Barton, seems to have been in direct response to 
the concerns raised in Justice Miller’s dissent in Barton.  
Criticizing the scope of the Court’s holding, Justice Miller 
noted that the role of a receiver had expanded well beyond 
winding up the affairs of a defunct corporation and 
liquidating its assets, to in some situations, essentially 
 
                                              
3 The original provision applied only to “receivers” 
and “managers” of property.  Act of Congress of Mar. 3, 
1911, ch. 231, §§ 65, 66, 36 Stat. 1104 (repealed 1948).  In 
1948, Congress amended the statute and extended it to 
“trustees” and “debtors in possession.”  62 Stat. 926 (June 25, 
1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 959(a)). 
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running the company.4
                                              
4 Justice Miller was particularly worried about the 
potential effect of the majority’s holding on suits against 
railroad corporations.  Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 137-
38 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting).  He noted that it had 
become common for a railroad to place its daily operations in 
the hands of a receiver.  Id.  The receiver would then “take[] 
the property out of the hands of its owner, operate[] the road 
in his own way, with an occasional suggestion from the court, 
which he recognize[d] as a sort of partner in the business.”  
Id. at 138.  Although the receiver would pay some of the 
corporation’s debts, he would also enter into new contracts, 
incur new obligations, and frequently add to the corporation’s 
debts.  Id.  For all intents and purposes, the receiver was 
“performing the functions of a common carrier of goods and 
passengers.”  Id. 
  Barton, 104 U.S. at 137-38 (Miller, 
J., dissenting).  Justice Miller opined that it would be 
fundamentally unfair to require a party to obtain court 
permission to pursue claims against the receiver arising out of 
the receiver’s operation of the business.  Id. at 138.  Such a 
system would render the everyday operations of the 
corporation “exempt[] from the operation of common law” 
and deprive potential litigants of the right “to have their 
complaints tried by [a] jury or by the ordinary courts of 
justice.”  Id.  Rather, a party’s only remedy against the 
corporation would be in “the hands of . . . the court which 
appointed [the receiver].”  Id.  In contrast, Justice Miller 
agreed with the majority that “[w]hen a receiver [was] 
appointed to wind up a defunct corporation . . . [and] his sole 
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duty [was] to convert the property into a fund for the payment 
of debts, . . . a very strong reason exist[ed] why the court 
which appointed him should alone control him in the 
performance of his duty.”  Id. 
When Congress enacts legislation, it is presumed to act 
with knowledge of the “existing law and judicial concepts.”  
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 112 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  As Judge Learned Hand recognized, it is 
readily apparent that Congress shared Justice Miller’s 
concerns and, in enacting § 959(a), intended to create an 
exception to the Barton rule for situations where the receiver 
was “continu[ing]” the debtor’s business, rather than simply 
administering the estate.  See Vass, 59 F.2d at 971 (explaining 
that the provision “was apparently passed to meet the doctrine 
of Barton v. Barbour”).  Our sister circuits have consistently 
recognized § 959(a) as a limited exception to Barton.  See, 
e.g., In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 971; Muratore, 
375 F.3d at 143; In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d at 
1240-41.  We agree.  Congress’s creation of what appears to 
be a statutory exception to a common law rule strongly 
suggests its acknowledgement and acceptance of the general 
rule.  Mindful that “Congress ‘does not, one might say, hide 
elephants in mouseholes,’”  Bilksi v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3250 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 
(2001)), we believe that had Congress intended to abrogate 
Barton in its entirety, it would have done so explicitly.  
Especially when viewed in light of Justice Miller’s dissent in 
Barton, it is abundantly clear that Congress intended to 
narrow the scope of the Barton doctrine by creating an 
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exception for situations in which the policy rationales 
underlying the Court’s creation of the doctrine were not 
applicable.  Under § 959(a), where a trustee or receiver is 
actually operating the business, and the acts complained of 
involved the trustee’s “conducting the debtor’s business in the 
ordinary sense of the words or [his] pursuing that business as 
an operating enterprise,” an aggrieved party need not seek 
permission from the appointing court before filing suit in 
another forum.  In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 971-
72 (citation omitted).  In contrast, where a trustee “acting in 
his official capacity conducts no business connected with the 
property other than to perform administrative tasks 
necessarily incident to the consolidation, preservation, and 
liquidation of assets in the debtor’s estate,” § 959(a) does not 
apply, and leave of court is still required before filing suit 
against the trustee.  In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d at 
276 (citations omitted).5
Significantly, although the Bankruptcy Code 
overhauled the bankruptcy system and replaced many of the 
bankruptcy statutes, § 959(a) was left intact.  Although 28 
U.S.C. § 959 is technically part of the Judicial Code, we note 
that the other subsection in § 959, subsection (b), was 
 
                                              
5 It is important to note that 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) does 
not apply here.  VistaCare was not in the business of buying 
and selling real estate.  Thus, in selling the lots on the 
Parkside property, the Trustee was not carrying on 
VistaCare’s business, but rather performing his duty as trustee 
to liquidate the assets of the estate. 
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amended when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code.6
                                              
6 Section 959(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides:  
  
Thus, Congress was clearly aware of § 959 when it adopted 
the Code, and its decision to leave subsection (a) intact is 
telling.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen 
Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write ‘on a 
clean slate.’”  Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) 
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, courts should be “reluctant 
to accept arguments that would interpret the Code . . . to 
effect a major change in pre-Code practice,” absent at least 
some suggestion in the legislative history that such a change 
was intended.  Id. (citations omitted).  Here, we can find no 
indication that Congress intended to abrogate the Barton 
doctrine.  Rather, its decision to leave § 959(a), the exception 
Except as provided in section 1166 of 
title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed 
in any cause pending in any court of the United 
States, including a debtor in possession, shall 
manage and operate the property in his 
possession as such trustee, receiver or manager 
according to the requirements of the valid laws 
of the State in which such property is situated, 
in the same manner that the owner or possessor 
thereof would be bound to do if in possession 
thereof. 
In 1978, Congress substituted “Except as provided in 
section 1166 of title 11, a trustee” for “A trustee.”  Act of 
Congress of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-958. 
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to Barton, intact strongly suggests that Barton’s general rule 
remains valid. 
Moreover, the policies underlying the Barton doctrine 
continue to apply with full force to bankruptcy proceedings.  
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy estate 
is created, which consists of, with certain exceptions, all of 
the debtor’s legal or equitable interests in property, wherever 
located and by whomever held.  11 U.S.C. § 541(a).  The 
district court in which a bankruptcy case is commenced has 
exclusive jurisdiction over all of the property of the estate, 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1), and the bankruptcy court within such 
district may hear and determine all cases under the 
Bankruptcy Code and all “core proceedings” arising under the 
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).  Because a judgment against the 
trustee, whether ultimately satisfied out of the assets of the 
estate or out of the trustee’s pockets, may affect the 
administration of the estate, “[t]he requirement of uniform 
application of bankruptcy law dictates that all legal 
proceedings that affect the administration of the bankruptcy 
estate” be either brought in the bankruptcy court or with the 
permission of the bankruptcy court.  In re Crown Vantage, 
Inc., 421 F.3d at 971.  “If debtors, creditors, defendants in 
adversary proceedings, and other parties to a bankruptcy 
proceeding could sue the trustee in state court for damages 
arising out of the conduct of the proceeding, [the state] court 
would have the practical power to turn bankruptcy losers into 
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bankruptcy winners, and vice versa.”  In re Linton, 136 F.3d 
at 546.7
Although the Bankruptcy Court did not address the 
impact of § 959(a), it opined that several other changes 
implemented by the Code have raised questions about the 
continued applicability of the Barton doctrine.  First, the 
Bankruptcy Court noted that under the Code, trustees are no 
longer appointed by the bankruptcy court, but instead are 
 
                                              
7 Citing McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891), 
and Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), the Trustee 
argues that a suit against a trustee based on acts taken in his 
official capacity will always be a suit against the estate, 
satisfied out of the assets of the estate.  We disagree with the 
Trustee’s interpretation of McNulta and Brown insofar as he 
argues that those cases established a categorical rule that 
judgments against a trustee will always be satisfied out of the 
assets of the estate.  In Brown, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged its previous statement in McNulta that actions 
against a receiver “are official and not personal, and 
judgments against him as receiver are payable only from the 
funds in his hands,” but classified that statement as dicta.  
Brown, 391 U.S. at 477 n.7 (quoting McNulta, 141 U.S. at 
332).  The Brown Court explained that it would be wrong to 
infer from McNulta that “an action against the receiver 
personally . . . would never lie under any circumstances.”  Id.  
Therefore, like the Bankruptcy Court, we express no opinion 
as to whether a judgment against the Trustee in this case will 
ultimately be satisfied out of the assets of the estate or out of 
the Trustee’s pockets. 
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appointed by a United States Trustee.  Second, the 
Bankruptcy Court observed that 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides for 
the automatic stay of all suits and lien enforcement efforts 
against the debtor or the debtor’s estate, thus making it more 
difficult for a third party to drain the assets of the estate.  
Finally, although the Bankruptcy Judge did not raise this 
concern here, in his decision in In re Lambert, he noted that 
11 U.S.C. § 323(b) provides that a trustee “has capacity to sue 
and be sued,” but says nothing about a leave-of-court 
requirement.  438 B.R. at 525-26.  We will discuss these 
points in turn. 
We first address the contention that changes in the way 
in which trustees are appointed undermined the basis for the 
Barton doctrine.  Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 
30 Stat. 544 (1898) (superseded 1978) (“the Bankruptcy 
Act”), and the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) 
(superseded 1978), the predecessors to the Code, trustees 
were appointed by the courts.  However, when the Code was 
adopted in 1978, a pilot program was initiated, under which 
the power to appoint bankruptcy trustees was vested in the 
United States Department of Justice.  2 Norton Bankr. L. & 
Prac. 3d § 26:1 (3d ed. 2012).  The program was “designed to 
remove the . . . awkward relationship between bankruptcy 
judges and private trustees, whom they appoint[ed], which 
ha[d] generated great disrespect for the bankruptcy system.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 113 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6074.  In 1986, Congress added 28 
U.S.C. § 581, which established the United States Trustee 
System on a national basis.  Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 
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3088, 3091 (1986).8  Under the current system, the U.S. 
Attorney General is charged with the appointment of United 
States Trustees, who, among other things, “establish, 
maintain, and supervise [] panel[s] of private trustees that are 
eligible and available to serve as trustees in cases under 
chapter 7.”  28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1).  Upon the commencement 
of a Chapter 7 case, the U.S. Trustee selects an individual 
from the panel to serve as the trustee in that case.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(1).9
CGL argues that because the Barton doctrine 
specifically requires leave of the appointing court, and there 
is no appointing court under the modern bankruptcy system, 
Barton is no longer valid.  We disagree.  A bankruptcy trustee 
is the “statutory successor to the equity receiver” and “[j]ust 
like an equity receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in 
effect” for the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceeding, 
“administering property that has come under the court’s 
control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.”  In re Linton, 136 
 
                                              
8 The only exceptions are Alabama and North 
Carolina, which are not part of the United States Trustee 
System, and in the judicial districts in those states, bankruptcy 
courts retain the power of appointment and direct supervision.  
2 Norton. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d § 26:1 (3d ed. 2012). 
9 Under 11 U.S.C. § 701, a member of the panel of 
private trustees is initially appointed to serve on an interim 
basis.  Eligible creditors subsequently have an opportunity to 
elect a trustee, and if no trustee is elected, the interim trustee 
serves as trustee in the case.  11 U.S.C. § 702. 
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F.3d at 545.  In changing the way in which trustees are 
appointed, Congress did not alter the fundamental role of the 
bankruptcy trustee as a fiduciary, overseen by the bankruptcy 
court.  Although U.S. Trustees now “aid[] bankruptcy judges 
in monitoring certain aspects of bankruptcy proceedings,” 
United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 225 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), the bankruptcy court is the 
entity primarily responsible for authorizing acts by the 
trustee.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (providing that sale 
or other disposition of property by the trustee is subject to 
review by the bankruptcy court); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(c) 
(requiring trustee to file with the bankruptcy court a motion to 
sell property free and clear of all liens).  Additionally, 
bankruptcy courts retain the ability to remove a trustee (other 
than the U.S. Trustee) for cause.  11 U.S.C. § 324(a).  We 
therefore disagree with the Bankruptcy Court’s statement that 
a trustee is “really just another advocate that appear[s] 
before” it.  The trustee remains, for all intents and purposes, 
an officer of the bankruptcy court.  Thus, the fact that 
bankruptcy trustees are no longer appointed by the court does 
not persuade us that the Barton doctrine has been superseded 
by statute. 
The Bankruptcy Court further opined that the Barton 
doctrine is no longer necessary in light of 11 U.S.C. § 362, 
which provides for the automatic stay of any attempt to 
collect against property of the estate.  We disagree.  First, as 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained 
in In re Linton, there are several rationales for the Barton 
doctrine unrelated to the concern that a suit against the trustee 
could directly threaten the assets of the estate.  136 F.3d at 
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545-46.  If a trustee is burdened by having to defend against 
suits in other courts, the trustee’s actions on behalf of the 
bankruptcy court, the estate, and the estate’s creditors will 
likely be impeded.  Id. at 545.  Moreover, without a court 
approval requirement, trusteeship would become a “more 
irksome duty,” thereby discouraging qualified people from 
serving as trustees.  Id. (noting that trustees would likely have 
to pay higher malpractice premiums).  Finally, requiring 
prospective plaintiffs to set forth to the bankruptcy court the 
basis of their claims against the trustee would allow the 
bankruptcy court to monitor the work of the trustee more 
effectively, and ensure that the trustee is satisfying his 
obligations.  Id. 
Second, assuming a suit against a bankruptcy trustee in 
another forum would jeopardize the assets of the estate, 
Congress’s adoption of § 362 still does not convince us that it 
intended to abrogate Barton.10
                                              
10 We emphasize that we are assuming, for the purpose 
of addressing the Bankruptcy Court’s point, that the assets of 
the estate will be affected.  As we noted in Footnote 7, supra, 
we express no opinion as to whether a judgment against the 
Trustee in this case will be satisfied out of the assets of the 
estate. 
  The power of a court to stay 
collection efforts against the debtor has always been an 
integral part of bankruptcy law.  See 1A Collier on 
Bankruptcy § 11, at 130 (1898 ed.) (“The power to stay suits 
concerning the person or property of the bankrupt is essential 
to the orderly administration of a bankruptcy law.”).  Mindful 
of the Supreme Court’s admonition that we should not read a 
 
23 
Bankruptcy Code provision to “effect a major change in pre-
Code practice” absent clear congressional intent, Dewsnup, 
502 U.S. at 419, we will briefly review the history of the 
automatic stay in bankruptcy. 
Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided 
that a lawsuit pending when a bankruptcy petition was filed 
would be stayed if the suit was based on a claim that would 
be subject to discharge.  § 11, 30 Stat. at 549.  However, the 
Act’s stay provision was not “self-executing” and therefore 
some affirmative action by the court was required to invoke 
the stay.  Frank Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 
11 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 175, 184-85 (1978) (citations omitted).  
In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler Act, which provided 
for automatic stays under Chapters X and XII.  §§ 148, 428, 
52 Stat. at 888, 918.  There was confusion, however, 
regarding the scope of the Chandler Act’s provisions, 
including whether they applied to other chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Act.  Mark Shaiken & Cindi Woolery, Automatic 
Stay Litigation in Bankruptcy 3 (1996).  Therefore, when the 
former Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were adopted, 
a separate automatic stay provision was included for each 
chapter.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 10-601(a) (1977) (superseded 
1978) (“A petition filed under [Chapter X] shall operate as a 
stay of the commencement or the continuation of any court or 
other proceeding against the debtor, or the enforcement of 
any judgment against it, or of any act or the commencement 
or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce any lien 
against its property . . . .”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 11-44(a) (1977) 
(superseded 1978) (same for Chapter XI); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
12-43(a) (1977) (superseded 1978) (same for Chapter XII); 
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Fed. R. Bankr. P. 13-401(a) (1977) (superseded 1978) (same 
for Chapter XIII). 
In 1978, as part of the new Bankruptcy Code, 
Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides that upon 
the filing of a voluntary or involuntary case, all suits and lien 
enforcement efforts against the debtor or the debtor’s estate 
shall be automatically enjoined, subject to certain exceptions 
for repeat bankruptcy filers.  The legislative history 
accompanying § 362 explains that its primary purpose was to 
give the debtor a “breathing spell” from creditors, to allow the 
debtor to begin the process of discharging his debts, and 
where applicable, to develop a repayment or reorganization 
plan.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 174, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6135.  Section 362 was also intended to 
protect creditors by preventing one creditor from obtaining 
payment of its claims to the detriment of others.  Id.  The 
legislative history noted that the existing automatic stay 
provisions were “inadequate, both from the standpoint of the 
debtor . . . and of the creditor.”  Id.  Therefore, § 362 
“expand[ed] coverage in some areas, reduce[d] it in others, 
and clarifie[d] many uncertain aspects of the [old] 
provisions.”  Id.  Given that the applicability of the Barton 
doctrine under the pre-Code system has not been questioned, 
despite the existence of automatic stay provisions under the 
Bankruptcy Act and the former Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, we decline to interpret the changes implemented 
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by § 362 as eliminating the long-standing common law 
Barton doctrine.11
Finally, we address CGL’s argument that because 11 
U.S.C. § 323(b) provides that a trustee has the “capacity to 
sue and be sued,” but mentions no leave-of-court 
requirement, no such requirement exists.  In In re Lambert, 
the bankruptcy court stated, “[s]hould Congress have wanted 
to subject lawsuits against the trustee to preliminary court 
approval, it clearly could have used language that [it] inserted 
in multiple other provisions directing the need for court 
authorization.”  438 B.R. at 525-26 (citations omitted); see 
also In re Reich, 54 B.R. 995, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) 
(concluding that because court approval is not mentioned as a 
prerequisite, “[t]he implication is that none is required”).  
This is an overly simplistic analysis.  “As the Supreme Court 
has often noted, ‘statutory construction is a holistic 
 
                                              
11 We also note that the availability of one mechanism 
to protect against depletion of the assets of the bankruptcy 
estate does not necessarily foreclose others.  Bankruptcy 
courts have broad powers (in addition to 11 U.S.C. § 362) to 
protect the property of the estate.  For example, under 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a), a bankruptcy court may issue injunctive 
relief “where parties are pursuing actions pending in other 
courts that threaten the integrity of a bankrupt’s estate.”  In re 
DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1242 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(internal marks and citations omitted).  Here, the Bankruptcy 
Court left open the possibility that it could enjoin CGL’s 
proposed state court case “should property of the estate be 
threatened.” 
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endeavor,’ and this is especially true of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”  In re Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers 
of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).  
We must “not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.”  In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986)) 
(additional citations omitted).  Here, this requires us to look at 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6009, which provides:  
“[w]ith or without court approval, the trustee . . . may 
prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending 
action or proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence 
and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate 
before any tribunal.”  This rule establishes only that a trustee 
may, with or without court approval, act as a representative of 
the estate in litigation; it does not address the circumstances 
under which a third party may bring suit against the trustee.  
See id.  “When the interpretation of federal statutes fails to 
yield specific answers to procedural issues, federal courts 
have implicit authority to supply the answers.”  In re Linton, 
136 F.3d at 545.  Thus, although § 323(b) recognizes that a 
trustee has the capacity to be sued, the procedures which must 
be followed before commencing any suit against the trustee 
not otherwise authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) have been left 
to case law.  See In re Kashani, 190 B.R. 875, 884 n.9 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that § 323(b) “merely 
indicates the proper party to sue for purposes of standing”).  
We therefore reject CGL’s argument that the text of § 323(b) 
indicates a congressional intent to abrogate the Barton 
doctrine. 
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In sum, we hold that the Barton doctrine remains valid, 
and therefore, subject to the exception in § 959(a), a party 
must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it brings 
an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee for 
acts done in the trustee’s official capacity. 
B. 
 Although the Bankruptcy Court expressed skepticism 
as to whether Barton applied, it nevertheless held a hearing 
on CGL’s motion for leave,12
 A party seeking leave of court to sue a trustee “must 
make a prima facie case against the trustee, showing that its 
claim is not without foundation.”  In re Nat’l Molding Co., 
230 F.2d at 71 (citations omitted).  Although, as CGL 
 and ultimately granted the 
motion.  The Bankruptcy Court therefore complied with 
Barton and we will consider whether its decision to grant 
CGL’s motion for leave constituted an abuse of discretion.  In 
re Linton, 136 F.3d at 546; In re Beck Indus., 725 F.2d at 889.  
Under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we will 
reverse “only where the . . . court’s decision is arbitrary, 
fanciful, or clearly unreasonable—in short, where no 
reasonable person would adopt the . . . court’s view.”  United 
States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
marks and citation omitted). 
                                              
12 Our holding should not be read as requiring a 
bankruptcy court to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion for 
leave in every case.  Whether to hold a hearing is within the 
sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. 
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observed at oral argument, the “not without foundation” 
standard is similar to the standard courts employ when 
evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), we emphasize that the former involves a 
greater degree of flexibility.  Compare Barefoot Architect, 
Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) (“To 
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)), with In re 
Nat’l Molding Co., 230 F.2d at 71.  Reviewing courts should 
accord significant deference to the determinations of the 
bankruptcy court, which, given its familiarity with the 
underlying facts and the parties, is uniquely situated to 
determine whether a claim against the trustee has merit.  The 
bankruptcy court is also uniquely situated to determine the 
potential effect of a judgment against the trustee on the 
debtor’s estate.  As the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel noted in In re Kashani, the decision whether to grant 
leave may involve a “balancing of the interests of all parties 
involved” and consideration of whether another tribunal may 
have expertise regarding the issues in the proposed suit.  190 
B.R. at 886, 887 (citation omitted).  We will not second-guess 
the bankruptcy court’s judgment unless it is clear from the 
record that the proposed suit is wholly lacking in factual or 
legal support.  See Anderson, 520 F.2d at 1029 (explaining 
that permission to sue a trustee “ordinarily should be granted 
unless it is clear that the claim is without foundation”). 
 In this case, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that CGL had met its burden of 
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establishing that its claims against the Trustee were “not 
without foundation.”  CGL’s motion for leave alleged that 
(1) “[t]he sales of individual lots in violation of Restriction 
No. 1 [were] unlawful and . . . caused damage to CGL’s 
property interests in Lot 45” and (2) the agreement between 
the Trustee and the Township was “an attempt to deprive 
CGL of its property rights without notice and without due 
process of law.”  Although CGL’s motion did not specify a 
particular state law cause of action, as the Bankruptcy Court 
observed, the proposed state court action would be a property 
dispute involving the status of Restriction No. 1, and whether 
the owner of a lot in the subdivision could enforce the 
restriction against another owner. 
CGL’s motion set forth the following factual 
allegations:  (1) the Parkside subdivision plan included a 
recorded restriction prohibiting the sale of lots to “parties 
having residences constructed” on the lots; (2) in purchasing 
Lot 45, CGL relied on assurances from the Township 
Solicitor that Restriction No. 1 did not prevent the sale of Lot 
45, and the Bankruptcy Court’s March 10, 2009 order 
confirming that the sale was “free and clear of Restriction 
#1”; (3) after the sale of Lot 45, the Trustee filed motions 
with the Bankruptcy Court seeking authorization to sell the 
individual lots in the mobile home park, but none of those 
motions advised the court of Restriction No. 1’s applicability 
to the individual lots; (4) the Trustee then sold most of the 
lots in the mobile home park to individual residents who had 
affixed their mobile homes to the land; and (5) on 
December 14, 2009, the Trustee and the Township entered 
into an agreement which purported to abrogate Restriction 
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No. 1 as to the forty-four individual lots, and CGL was not a 
party to that agreement.  During the hearing on CGL’s 
motion, Grant Wise, the owner of CGL, testified that he was 
under the assumption when he purchased Lot 45 that 
Restriction No. 1 remained in place with respect to the forty-
four individual lots, and explained that single ownership was 
crucial to his decision to purchase. 
As the District Court noted, CGL had presented 
“evidence of a restriction on the deeds to the individual lots 
that had been recorded,” and there was “a legitimate 
disagreement about the status of those restrictions.”  In re 
Vistacare Grp., LLC, 2011 WL 2111997, at *4.  The 
Bankruptcy Court determined that a state court would 
“probably ha[ve] expertise in [the] area,” and therefore state 
court was the appropriate forum in which to resolve the 
dispute.  This was not an abuse of discretion.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, a restriction in a subdivision plan creates 
an enforceable restrictive covenant, even if the restriction is 
not specifically set forth in the deeds conveying the lots 
created by the subdivision.  Ballard v. Heppe, 589 A.2d 266, 
268-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Doylestown Twp. v. Teeling, 
635 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).  A land owner in 
a subdivision may institute an action against the developer or 
another owner in the subdivision to enforce restrictive 
covenants that appeared in the recorded subdivision plan.  
Berg v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., 822 A.2d 810, 819-20 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2003) (discussing Perrige v. Horning, 654 A.2d 
1183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)).  For example, in Perrige v. 
Horning, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an owner 
in a subdivision could bring suit to enforce a restrictive 
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covenant in a previously approved subdivision plan, and to 
enjoin an attempt by another owner and the municipality to 
alter that plan in a way that violated the existing restrictions.  
654 A.2d at 1186-87; see also Gey v. Beck, 568 A.2d 672, 
673, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (issuing injunction to protect 
lot owners who were granted “protective covenants” to 
preserve the residential nature of a development); Teeling, 
635 A.2d at 661 (finding that conditions attached to a 
subdivision plan could be enforced in equity by an owner of 
other lots in the subdivision). 
Here, CGL purchased Lot 45, a parcel within the 
Parkside subdivision.  The subdivision was subject to a 
restrictive covenant barring the sale of lots to individuals with 
residences constructed on the lots.  Nevertheless, the Trustee 
sold many of the forty-four individual lots to such 
individuals, and together with the Township, attempted to 
remove the restrictive covenant to allow for the sales.  
Although we express no opinion regarding CGL’s likelihood 
of success on its claims once it gets to state court, the 
Bankruptcy Court did not err in concluding that the claims 
were “not without foundation.”  See In re Nat’l Molding Co., 
230 F.2d at 71.  Admittedly, “[r]estrictive covenants must be 
construed in light of their language, their subject matter, the 
intent or purpose of the parties, and the conditions 
surrounding their execution.”  Perrige, 654 A.2d at 1188 
(citation omitted).  However, in determining whether a 
proposed suit related to the enforcement of a restrictive 
covenant is “not without foundation,” a bankruptcy court 
need not make factual findings regarding the parties’ intent.  
See In re Nat’l Molding Co., 230 F.2d at 71; Perrige, 654 
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A.2d at 1188.  It is within the discretion of the bankruptcy 
court to determine that such questions are most appropriately 
answered by a state tribunal. 
On appeal, the Trustee maintains that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in failing to consider his arguments that he was 
entitled to immunity for the challenged actions, or 
alternatively, that the proposed suit was barred under 
preclusion principles.13
                                              
13 At oral argument, CGL asserted that the immunity 
issue was never raised before the Bankruptcy Court and thus 
we should consider it waived.  Although CGL is correct that 
the issue was not addressed during the October 21, 2010 
hearing before the Bankruptcy Court, the Trustee did raise 
immunity as a defense in his response to CGL’s motion for 
leave.  This was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate 
review. 
  We disagree.  A bankruptcy court is 
not required to consider immunities and defenses raised by a 
trustee when evaluating a motion for leave.  A bankruptcy 
court cannot be expected to conduct a trial on the merits of a 
party’s proposed state law claim against a trustee simply to 
decide whether to grant leave to pursue such a claim in state 
court.  The bankruptcy court need only satisfy itself that the 
claim is “not without foundation.”  In re Nat’l Molding Co., 
230 F.2d at 71.  The trustee, of course, will retain the right to 
raise immunities and defenses in state court. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court affirming the order of the Bankruptcy Court 
granting CGL’s motion for leave.  We hold that:  (1) the 
Barton doctrine continues to apply to bankruptcy trustees; 
and (2) the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that CGL’s proposed claims were “not without 
foundation.” 
